Security Councill

# STUDY GUIDE

## 1.The Situation in Moldova.

## 2. Discussing the Potential Reform of the United Nations Security Council's Use of Sanctions and the Sanctions Committees.

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# 1. LETTER FORM THE CHAIRBOARD

Hello there, we are Ivo and Alex and we are absolutely delighted to be your SC Presidents at JASMUN 2026. We have been working tirelessly to deliver a truly exquisite study guide for you all, so that you can have an amazing and professional experience at JASMUN.

We would also like to sincerely thank the JASMUN secretariat, especially the PGA Kalina for giving us the opportunity to be the chairs at this exquisite conference.
This study guide, which you are reading right now, has been crafted by us with you, the Delegates in mind. Through many long calls and meetups we have consulted and written the study guide in order for you to have the most fun MUN experience yet, so that the debates not only fluster with knowledge about the topic, but also with passion for public speaking.

With that being said we are delighted to present the magnificent Study Guide to you, we hope that you enjoy reading this piece of art and we will be waiting to see your amazing performance in our lovely committee.

Lastly we would like to welcome you to communicate with us via messenger if the need arises. We are fully open to help with each and every issue you come with during the research and preparation for the conference. It is important to remember that we are always open to helping you with any matter! We wish you a smooth preparation for JASMUN and a blooming read of the Study Guide.

See you all in Warsaw,
Alex and Ivo

# 2. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE

The United Nations Security Council was established in 1945 following the end of the Second World War during the San Francisco Conference, officially known as the United Nations Conference on International Organization. The UNSC aims at preventing the recurrence of global conflicts by addressing threats to global peace and security.

Since its creation, the UNSC has played a crucial role in mediating internal and external disputes, deploying peacekeeping missions, and implementing measures to counter aggression and instability all around the world.

The UNSC is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and holds the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Delegates of this committee can be referred to as ambassadors (if you use this wording, the equivalent of delegation is ambassadorship, not embassy - that is a building).
Being the only committee with binding resolutions, it addresses conflicts that pose threats to global stability by investigating disputes, introducing peaceful resolutions, and taking decisive actions when peace is at risk.

The UNSC has the authority to impose sanctions, authorize military interventions, and oversee the regulation of armaments, making it a cornerstone of the UN's mission.

The Security Council consists of five permanent members, that being China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Each of whom holds veto power, and other non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms.

When writing the resolution, ambassadors should consider the threat of a P5 country raising a veto that will automatically reject it. Keep in mind that veto power can only be used during committee sessions, not during the General Assembly. The Council's binding resolutions are enforced through UN peacekeepers, drawn from member nations and funded through the UN budget.

This powerful and unique structure places the Security Council at the heart of the UN's efforts to maintain international law and respond to global crises.

# 3. INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST TOPIC

During the breakup of the USSR in 1991 many new breakaway republics emerged. Often they clashed over their territorial disputes, very prominently in the Caucasus region, however a case that resulted in a remarkably dubious compromise was the one taking place in Europe – the case of the Republic of Moldova and the , more commonly known
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic
as Transnistria.

The two emerging states engaged in a brief, yet brutal war that resulted in over a thousand casualties and two hundred thousand people being displaced, which was ended through the – legally shady – intervention of the Russian troops in Moldova. What followed after the end of the conflict wasn't a resolution to the issue at hand, but a ceasefire that simply froze the line and froze the issue. A Russian-backed peacekeeping mission, Joint Control Commission (JCC), was established in the Transnistrian region, creating a demilitarised zone alongside the Dniester river, governed by three armies - Russian, Moldovan and Transnistrian.

The very same JCC laid the foundations for the following thirty years of unsuccessful negotiations. From the JCC, through the 1997 Moscow Memorandum, the ill-fated Kozak plan of 2003 to the OSCE's 5+2 talks, all being forums that have managed the conflict without ever managing to end it. Transnistria since then became more of a political curiosity, a state not being recognised by any UN member states, even Russia, which largely supports its existence militarily and economically. The only two republics to recognise it are Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which aren't internationally recognised as well.

Despite such talks taking place the issue in Moldova was mostly forgotten by the wide-public, as many more conflicts took place in different parts of the world,

however one of those new emerging conflicts, brought the Transnistrian dispute back to life. The biggest armed conflict in Europe since 1945, the War, has shed some new light on the status of Russo-Ukrainian Transnistria and Moldova, as Transnistria shares a four hundred kliometers long border with Ukraine and is in the close proximity of Odessa.

The conflict led to even more division, as Moldova took a Russo-sceptic and Pro-European path, beginning accession talks with the EU, electing a Pro-European government in 2025 and formally withdrawing from the CIS (as the name Transnistria suggests) in 2026. Moldova following in these steps has proposed demilitarisation and the internationally supervised reintegration of Transnistria, effectively labeling Russian forces residing in de recognised Moldovan territories persona non grata.
jure internationally

Fig. 1: Map of Moldova, Transnistria and River Dniester with personal notes of Aleksander Cichoński.



The left bank of Dniester is on the right side on the map and vice versa, while top is at the bottom and so on, so get familiarised with this absolutely not confusing nomenclature :)

# 4. HISTORICAL BACKROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

**From Soviets to War (1918-1992)**

The roots of the Transnistrian divergence from the rest of Moldova started sooner than during the Soviet collapse, as they predate it by nearly seventy years. It all came to be even previous to the formation of the Soviet Union, let alone its end. In 1918, Bessarabia – most of today's Moldova – united with Romania in 1918, however this union was never recognised by Moscow and as such in 1924 the USSR created the Autonomous SSR on the other Moldavian bank of Dniester, inside what was before the Soviet Ukraine. This new territory was less of a homeland for an already existing population, as only thirty percent of its inhabitants were ethnic Romanians, but more a deliberate political play creating a Piedmont for eventually trying to reclaim Bessarabia. Their claim was executed during the Second World War as per the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It became a Soviet sphere of influence and when the Red Army occupied its capital it was merged with the part of the old MASSR to form the new SSR. As Moldavian war, death and famine took its toll around Europe, the MSSR wasn't spared, for after the Wehrmacht conquered those territories a new Romanian-administered, but Nazi backed "Transnistria Governorate" was formed and the modern breakaway territories became a site of mass Jewish and Gypsy deportations and deaths. After that the name Transnistria stuck to those territories, an association which the modern Transnistrian government tries to continuously fight, through many legal ways.

After the war ended the Soviet status quo returned and Bessarabia and Transnistria once more merged into one political entity. As easily predictable, if one puts two not necessarily related Eastern European peoples (Slavs and Romanians) and make them coexist in one country due to their inherent xenophobia they will not live in peace and in such a country they will try to find division in every possible way. Again, not so surprisingly despite the merger they began to develop separate institutional tracks, but the conflict was frozen. The spark that reactivated the division and reminded them of their inherent hate of each other came in 1989, when the SSR

Moldavian made Moldovan the sole state language. Moldovan, written in Latin rather than Cyrillic alphabets was celebrated in Bessarabia as a national revival, what was received on the left, more Russified, bank of Dniester as an existential threat. Despite the outrage they all managed to hold it together for just one more year and thus in September 1990 Transnistria declared their independence from MSSR forming the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, as a new split within the USSR and later in August 1991 during the collapse of the Soviet Union, Transnistria with its capital in Tiraspol declared their independence two days before Moldova itself did. Firstly those two began clashing, those little border clashes escalated quickly into the open war by March 1992, where the newly formed Moldovan forces, mainly civilian volunteers and police forces combated against Transnistrian Cossack volunteers and armed militias. The war's defining battle at Bender in June 1992, which also featured the 14th Soviet-turned Russian army was won by separatist forces in fighting that resulted in the deaths of 1,132 people and the displacement of roughly 200,000 more. After the battle, on the 21st of July 1992 a ceasefire was signed by both Presidents, which effectively ended the killing and froze the dispute on terms more favorable to Tiraspol. Pursuant to the ceasefire the 14th Army was now rebranded as a 'peacekeeping' mission rather than fully and formally withdrawn, a new demilitarised Security Zone was established brokered by the freshly formed trilateral Joint Control Commission (JCC), consisting of Moldova, Russia and Transnistria all as formally equal parties.

**Three Decades of Frozen Negotiations (1992-2014)**

My theory is that in the following two decades diplomats were paid by the hour rather than by the work done, as the time produced a great deal of activity and very little to no actual change. In 1997 the Moscow Memorandum committed both sides, naturally on paper, to a relationship described as "within a common state", which as ambiguous as it sounds didn't translate into anything productive, as truly both sides interpreted those words to their own advantage. Later at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, Russia officially pledged to complete troop withdrawal by 2002, a promise they never quite seemed to be able to keep as they missed the deadline worse than we did with the Study Guide, as 24 years have passed since. The two or rather the two and one behemothic great world power trying to widen its influence in the region actually almost came close to agreeing upon something with the Moscow-drafted "Kozak Memorandum" in

November 2003, which would have made Transnistria and the separately autonomous Gagauzia permanent vetoes in a federal Moldova, alongside a Russian military presence in Moldova for up to twenty years. The – definitely not favouring one side with a bigger military who also coincidentally drew it up – agreement proposal was rejected by President Voronin mere hours before Vladimir Putin arrived in Chișinău to sign it and hence didn't solve the issue at all.

After this unsuccessful attempt the mediation shifted to a broader and more balanced format, as in 2005 the "5+2" talks emerged, bringing Moldova and Transnistria together as parties, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediator, while the United States and European Union as observers. Only after eleven years came the most productive moment as between 2016 and 2018 six out of eight priority technical issues were agreed upon and those issues were: Latin-script, schooling, cross-border farmland access, neutral license plates and mutual diplomatic recognition among them. Despite not addressing the central to the issue political dispute it still was a landmark and a great achievement considering the frustrating negotiations attempts over the past twenty years. Over the next years Moldovan foreign policy shifted further and further away from Russia into a fully Europe-centralised path, which also led to more division between Moldova and Transnistria, as Russian-gas-dependent Pridnestrovie became increasingly out of step with now trading with the rest of the country it used to once belong to. Moldova in June 2014 signed the EU Association Agreement and free-trade areas, which went into force from 2016. And since 2018 no subsequent progress has been made and with what follows one might feel like the parties of the conflict shall never get to the bottom of this dispute.

**Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and its Consequences (2022-Now)**

Following Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Transnistria turned from a slowly ongoing diplomatic dispute that is being steadily solved to an active security concern for Ukraine, Russia and practically to the entirety of Europe. As the acting commander of Russia's Central Military District, Major General Rustam Minnekaev stated publicly that one of the aims of the war is to establish a land corridor to Transnistria due to alleged oppression of its Russian-speaking population. Now a keen eye could identify that all that Russia does is simply lie, as the same case was with Donbas and Crimea, which both led to a military escalation. After those statements a huge, unexpected and to this day unexplained bombing struck on different Transnistrian targets, as responsibility for them was never established; it could have been a false-flag operation perpetrated by either Russia or Transnistria

or whether it was a military operation conducted by Ukraine. Chișinău's answer to this unrest was simply to accelerate west, as Moldova, alongside Ukraine, won EU candidate status that same June, which was a direct security response to Russia's threats. With the invasion the 5+2
negotiations format naturally collapsed. Two years deep into the invasion, in February 2024, Transnistria's legislature had formally appealed to Russia for "protection" invoking in mind an unsettling similarity to the case of Donbas and the start of the war, furthermore Transnistria deemed Moldova's actions as "blocking everything Russian" and acting against Transnistrian interest.

Returning to the issue of Moldovan European integration, the formal EU accession negotiations opened in June 2024 and in October that year Moldovans passed a referendum enshrining EU accession as a state objective by a previously unprecedented narrow margin of approximately 50.35-50.38% of votes. This referendum took place amidst Chișinău's accusations of a Russian-linked vote-buying operation targeting around 300,000 votes. There is no official confirmation, whether the vote-buying operation ever happened and if it did whether it was Russian-backed, but the following elections ensured that Moldova stayed on the pro-European path, as the currently residing President Sandu was re-elected just days later. The same pattern repeated next year, when in the 28th September 2025 parliamentary election Sandu's PAS party won with a decisive majority of 50.2%, receiving 55 out of 101 parliamentary seats. At the Kyiv summit in April 2026 both presidents of Moldova and Ukraine committed to opening all six EU negotiating clusters simultaneously for both countries, targeting a signed accession treaty by 2028. The following month EU foreign policy chief – Kaja Kallas proposed to double security assistance flowing to Moldova through the European Peace Facility to a staggering 120 million Euro annually, which would amount to the bloc's largest defense package for any country, naturally excluding Ukraine.

Returning our focus to Transnistrian territories, it wasn't all so sunshine and rainbows as the already troublesome situation was accelerated by an immediate economic shock, as when the Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal lapsed with the beginning of January 2025, Gazprom stopped all deliveries to Transnistria, $709 million debt, effectively collapsing heating and power generation overnight while also triggering the state of humanitarian emergency. By the end of that year Transnistria's GDP was lowered by around 18%, which contrasted against Moldova's 2.7% percent growth was a very worrying indicator for Transnistrian governance alone and when combined with a doubled national rate of inflation is an

economic catastrophe. Turns out a friend who's a dickis a friend indeed, as Moldova decided to help Transnistria through flowing gas via Moldova's own company and later with EU-funded emergency supplies explicitly delivered under the condition of additional human-rights progress in Transnistria. This bold move proved that nothing is free in this world and that Moldova wasn't being a friendly neighbour, but was instead using humanitarian relief as a form of political leverage. Right now Romania and EBRD are financing two new cross-border transmission lines that would help Transnistria get back on its feet, without the need of re-installed Russian gas.

# 5. CASE STUDIES

## Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic

The Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic, as not a UN member state, enjoys little to none international recognition – not even from the Russian Federation, a state which sustains the so-called Transnistria military and until recently economically. Yet without the very recognition, in the case of Transnistria Russia is a force to be reckoned with, as their cooperation or resistance makes or breaks any and every deal and Transnistria treats it as such. As mentioned previously in this Study Guide it is only recognised by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, although it doesn't bother them at all, for they still maintain a full institutional and fully operative apparatus of a state – they mint their own coins, have their own passports – considered the weakest in the world, as valid in no internationally recognised state in the world – as well as their own parliament (Supreme Council) and a very strict border regime, all of which probably wouldn't be possible or wouldn't be possible to such an extent without the continued Russian aid.

The state was governed since December 2016 by President Vadim Krasnoselsky and, since 2022 by Prime Minister Aleksandr Rozenberg both who despite being supported by the – de facto monopolising the Pridnestrovian political landscape, through holding the super majority in the Supreme Council – Obnovlenie (Renewal) claim to be independent candidates. Recently, the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic has grown notably more assertive in the matters of the self-proclaimed identity (pride icon transnistria) and legitimacy, as in September 2024 the Supreme

Council banned the very use of the word “Transnistria” within its own territory requiring the term “Pridnestrovie”, effectively imposing fines or briefly imprisoning for such violations. With accordance with the natural law of the world we came to live in, such a rise in national identity-oriented pride can be associated with economic scarcity and so it is in this case. The Pridnestrovian economic situation is currently more precarious than at any point in its history since 1990s, as its entire industry is strongly dependent on the subsidised Russian gas, which due to the war has been cut off from Pridnestrovie. That January 2025 cut-off triggered an 18% contraction of the Pridnestrovian GDP and inflation rates double that of Moldova, which shows just how much self-sufficiency they have built through three decades of self-proclaimed independence.

In this complicated stalemate, both parties respond to each other’s movements and so when Chișinău's policies have hardened Tiraspol’s rhetoric have gone in step. Most prominent recent actions prove that tendency: the February 2024 “Congress of Deputies” appealing to Russia for “protection” against Moldovan customs and their enforcement, the May 2026 request through Leonid Manakov, a representative in Moscow (which makes no sense, since if they maintain diplomatic relations why on God’s green Earth doesn’t Russia recognise them) for more Russian “peacekeepers” in the region, a case oddly similar to the pre-invasion Donbas, as it has stopped just short of requesting an outright annexation. Those actions reflect in the Pridnestrovian international policy of resisting any settlement premised on full Moldovan sovereignty in the region. They advocate for prolonged Russian military support and renewed Russian economic presence, so essential to its survival, and that during negotiations they are recognised as a valid party, not a region to be reincorporated into the Moldovan territory, further seeking international recognition.

## Republic of Moldova

During this debate Moldova is the only UN Member State whose territorial integrity is most directly at stake. As of the 2024 elections they shifted their policy from a cautious negotiation based style lasting decades to a very active, decisive unilateral pressure on Russia and Pridnestrovie and a Pro-European approach. Nonetheless their position is very much constrained by their own 1994 Constitution, more specifically Article 11, which proclaims permanent neutrality and explicitly objects to any foreign military presence on Moldovan soil, which has been de facto violated the entire time of its existence. This can only be amended through a referendum

under Article 142, resulting in a much harder path to full-on European integration, regardless of changes occurring in the Pridnestrovian case. Those constitutional restraints have caused Moldova to rely more heavily on different diplomatic and economic instruments, like the Bureau for 5+2 Reintegration negotiation ,the format and more recently its own reintegration non-paper (great naming guys).

Furthermore, Moldova, lacking any serious military deterrent of their own, turned to Ukrainian efforts against Russia as their main security guarantee. Under President Sandu and a PAS government holding a decisive parliamentary majority since September 2025, Moldova has decided to take matters into their own hands and in early 2026 it has moved further and faster than at any prior point in the conflict's history (scary that you can get shit done if you don't elect stupid politicians, Poland should look and learn). They have moved forward with and requested EU accession, Transnistrian reintegration, separation from Russian institutions all coordinated under one reinforcing strategy. Furthermore, they filed and secured the passage of the aforementioned 2018 UN General Assembly resolution, set a target of a signed accession treaty by 2028, withdrawing from the CIS and deeming the entire OGRF as not welcome on Moldovan soil. All actions aim to promote demilitarisation, de-oligarchisation and rapid democratisation under international government and civilian oversight. Through those actions they showcased a strive for a corrective process, leading to sorting this conflict out once and for all. Moldova would advocate for their own sovereignty through forced forces withdrawal from Moldova, a Moldova-led, but internationally accepted and supervised reintegration process.

## Romania

Romania's stance on this dispute is more direct than among any other Moldova's neighbours, as it was the first state to recognise Moldovan independence in 1991, both countries share deep-lying linguistic, cultural and direct political ties, as for during the interwar period both were a joint state. Mainly for those reasons Bucharest constantly positioned itself as Chișinău's most committed advocate within both the EU and NATO. Naturally, Romanian support goes much further than just political advocacy, during the January 2025 energy crisis Romania supplied Moldova with emergency power exports to keep the country functioning and is now financing, along with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, two new major transmission lines, both of which directly aim to reduce Russian energy leverage in Moldova by the time both are set to come online around 2028.

Bucharest also supports Moldova in terms of their security; in August 2025, Romania formalised a trilateral security cooperation with two neighbours – Moldova and Ukraine under the banner of the “Odessa Triangle", which reflects Romanian stance that the issue of Transnistria stability, Moldova’s sovereignty and Ukraine’s independence constitute a single, interconnected security problem rather than three unrelated ones (all roads lead to Russia).

Furthermore, both Romania and Moldova every now and then reconsider the prospect of unification, with the most recent now and then coming in 2026, when new polling ranging from low-thirties to nearly forty-six percent showed support within Moldova all naturally depending on the methodology and technicalities of such a unification. Even President Sandu herself expressed openness to eventual unification, however insisted that before any such steps take place EU accession must come first and that such a matter will be in the end for Moldavians to decide. With such possibilities in mind Romania definitely supports an accelerated EU integration process for Moldova, while simultaneously viewing the Russian military presence in Transnistria as a direct threat to the Eastern European region and to NATO itself. What’s more Romania would advocate for Transnistria with its patron in Moscow to not hold a veto over the future of Moldova’s European integration.

## Russian Federation

Russia stands as one of the frontmen of this frozen conflict, as it serves the role of the guarantor of Transnistria’s continued attempted separation from Moldova and effectively holding all the cards to decide whether the situation stabilises or escalates any further. As of today roughly estimated 1,500 to 2,500 Russian forces remained stationed in the region of Pridnestrovie under the Operational Group of Russian Forces, characterised by Russian officials as a peacekeeping mission, rather than an occupying force, which is a definition proposed by Moldova. The troops remain stationed there despite Russia’s own unfulfilled 1999 Istanbul commitment to withdraw the forces, which still faces near-total international disagreement presented in the UN General Assembly’s 2018 resolution demanding their withdrawal. Russia, which doesn’t even recognise Transnistria’s independence preserve this ambiguous status as a source of leverage over Chișinău and a territory, as this seriously complicates Moldova’s path to join the EU or NATO, being definitely more beneficial for Russia than having a hard to access landlocked state between Moldova and Ukraine. The bright side to look at here is that Russia promotes self-restraint

and signaled that peacekeeping will never extend beyond Transnistria's own borders.

For previous decades Russian free or subsidised gas functioned as a key economic instrument in the region, which cutoff firstly demonstrated at how much of a Russian mercy Transnistria really is, but also how Russia slowly loses some parts of their affiliation in Pridnestrovie. Their reduced economic support was compensated with a rather more assertive and aggressive international approach, with Foreign Minister Lavrov repeatedly accusing the Sandu government of "blocking everything Russian" and warned that with their Pro-European actions they risk becoming "the next Ukraine".

Some Moldovan intelligence reports also suggest that Moscow sought to reinforce Transnistria with many more troops and spent significant resources around meddling in the 2024 Moldova's elections. They claimed they were set to invoke the pre-2014 Donbas precedent, threatening to use "all available methods" to protect Russian passport-holder in Transnistria (basically all the population since the Pridnestrovian passport is rather quite shit), being the clearest sign possible to indicate that if anything goes south Russia might use the same terms it have previously used to justify military/peacekeeping operations elsewhere. Meanwhile, due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russia's logistics and practical options are rather constrained, and as assessed by the Ukrainian intelligence, the Kremlin lacks resources right now to act upon their hardened rhetoric in Transnistria. Therefore, Russia's goal here is to defend the legitimacy of the self-proclaimed peacekeeping mission, as well as not agree to any fixed timelines of withdrawal of reintegration. They aim to frame and blame Moldova's CIS withdrawal as a destabilising unilateral action that isn't just a legitimate exercise of sovereignty

## Ukraine

For Ukraine, as a key player in the region and as a party in an ongoing conflict the Transnistrian question is rather inseparable from its own political situation, hence they – at times – present a dual approach. On one hand Ukraine is Moldova's closest security partner in this issue and a state whose border security is somewhat dependent on the developments taking place in Transnistria, since those two territories share a rather long border, while on another the preferred approach of Kyiv differs significantly from Chișinău's. For Moldova this very much means that

Ukraine would proactively support their claims for sovereignty and their progress on the Pro-European path, while not having to back or agree with all proposals and ideas coming from Chișinău.

Naturally, the proximity of a large city of Odessa, the Cobasna ammunition depot and the length of the shared border make this a very strategically important point for both Russia and Ukraine, which gives Ukraine a very direct and immediate interest in firstly nullifying the Russian forces and later preventing their stay in the Pridnestrovian territory. Their fears and objectives are justified by the very actions of Russia, which as early as in April 2022 named a land corridor connecting Russia to Transnistria as awar objective and later in April 2026 a "buffer zone" in Ukraine's Vinnytsia Oblast region, which was projected from the Transnistrian territory. Ukraine has multiple times voiced their rhetorical support for Moldova, as well as undertaking material actions, such as supplying radar systems to help Chișinău detect Russian drone incursions or sharing intelligence and coordinating joint threat assessments. During the April 2026 Kyiv summit, President Zelensky presented and clarified Ukraine's stance in the case of Transnistria, namely that any international governance or a transitional administration for Transnistria is fundamentally a matter for Moldova to decide upon, that Ukraine will not undertake any unilateral military action in Transnistria, unless Moldova explicitly requests such assistance and finally that the presence of Russian forces in Moldova will never be a basis for a territorial claim of Ukraine, but rather its own border-security problem. Ukraine unambiguously declines to endorse any Russian participation in future settlements or reintegration, while supporting the parallel accession path for Moldova, as both countries have turned to a similar more European and more Russo-sceptic approach.

# 6. INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND TOPIC

UNSC sanctions are semi-directly introduced in Article 41 Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which states that "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations."

In more casual language, Article 41 of the UN charter allows the Security Council to authorize "measures not involving the use of armed force", such as blockades and sanctions, to maintain or restore international peace. This is what distinguishes UNSC sanctions from sanctions of a singular nation—they're legally binding on all 193 UN member states under Article 25 of the Charter, which states that “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”.

The Second topic of the SC, being “Discussing the Potential Reform of the United Nations Security Council’s Use of Sanctions and the Sanctions Committees.” naturally discusses the flaws and potential space for improvement of the sanctions mechanism of the UNSC. The main issues within the sanctions are:

1. P5 veto power and political selectivity
2. Weak and uneven enforcement
3. Sanctions evasion
4. Lack of due process and transparency

# 7. HISTORICAL BACKROUND

Since 1966, the Security Council has established 31 sanctions regimes, which is about the same number as currently existing Angry Birds, giving us a lot of specific examples of sanctions imposed to choose from. For the sake of you, our ambassadors and representatives, we decided to select a few important ones to broaden the historical context of your UNSC sanctions knowledge. Keep in mind that it is key to understand how the process of sanctions is actually implemented.

The first ever UNSC sanctions were imposed on Southern Rhodesia (nice) in 1966 due to the fact that the white-minority government in Southern Rhodesia had made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom in 1965. The Security Council regarded the situation as a threat to international peace and security thus using the measures mentioned in Article 41 of the United Nations Charter.

The second clause of Resolution 232 is as follows:
Decides that all States Members of the United
Nations shall prevent:
(a) The import into their territories of asbestos, iron

ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the export of these commodities from Southern Rhodesia and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) Shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration of any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;

(d) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of arms ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia;

(e) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly, or maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia; the shipment in vessels and aircraft of their registration of any such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia; and any activities by their

nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia;
(f) Participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia;

UNSC Resolution 232, adopted on 16 December 1966, imposed sanctions including banning almost all forms of trade and economic relations, any military support and generally any foreign relations. It is the first mandatory UN Security Council sanctions regime.

The Security Council subsequently strengthened the sanctions through Resolution 253. A sanctions committee was established to monitor implementation of the aforementioned sanctions. The regime remained until 1979, when sanctions were terminated by Resolution 460 in the same year.

The second highlighted use of UNSC sanctions happened in the 90s, featuring Yugoslavia (nice) as the target. As Yugoslavia began to break apart, the Security Council adopted Resolution 713, which established an arms embargo.

Further sanctions followed, particularly Resolution 757, which imposed extensive economic and other restrictions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in connection with the conflict.

The Yugoslav sanctions experience was important because it showed how sanctions could be combined with peacekeeping, diplomacy and humanitarian exemptions. The UN ultimately terminated the relevant regime in the 1990s.

Furthermore, following North Korea's first nuclear test in October 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 on the 14th of October 2006.

It established:

- an arms embargo;
- an asset freeze;
- travel restrictions;
- restrictions on nuclear-related goods;
- restrictions on certain imports and exports.

The regime was subsequently expanded substantially through resolutions including 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

# 8. CURRENT ISSUES REGARDING SANCTIONS

United Nations Security Council sanctions remain one of the Council's most important non-military tools for responding to threats to international peace and security. However, their effectiveness continues to be debated because sanctions must balance political pressure on responsible actors with the protection of civilian populations. A major historical shift has been the movement from broad economic sanctions towards targeted measures such as asset freezes and travel restrictions, intended to reduce unintended harm. Despite this evolution, the Security Council continues to face questions over whether sanctions are sufficiently effective, proportionate, transparent, and consistently implemented.

One of the most serious current concerns is the humanitarian impact of sanctions, particularly in countries already experiencing conflict or economic instability. Although Resolution 2664 (2022) established a standing humanitarian exemption across UN sanctions regimes, humanitarian organisations can still face practical difficulties when banks, suppliers, and other actors adopt overly cautious compliance policies. This phenomenon, often described as over-compliance, can cause legitimate humanitarian transactions to be delayed even when they are formally permitted under UN rules. Delegates should therefore consider not only whether an exemption exists on paper, but whether humanitarian organisations can realistically access the financial systems, goods, and services necessary to assist civilians.

A second major issue concerns due process, transparency, and fairness when individuals or entities are placed on sanctions lists. Being designated can have significant consequences, yet the procedures for challenging a designation and obtaining removal from a list differ between sanctions regimes. Resolution 2744 (2024) introduced new procedures for delisting requests, while the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida regime continues to use the separate Ombudsperson mechanism. This

demonstrates an important challenge for delegates: sanctions need to remain decisive enough to protect international security while also providing credible opportunities for wrongly designated individuals or entities to seek review.

Another significant problem is uneven implementation and monitoring among Member States. Security Council sanctions are only as effective as the willingness and capacity of states to enforce them, and differences in domestic legislation, financial systems, border controls, and administrative capacity can create loopholes. The Council relies heavily on sanctions committees and expert panels to monitor implementation, but the loss or interruption of independent monitoring mechanisms can make it harder to identify violations and assess whether sanctions are achieving their intended objectives. For delegates, this raises a practical question: should the Council impose additional restrictions, or should it instead strengthen monitoring, information-sharing, technical assistance, and enforcement of measures already in place?

Finally, the political nature of the Security Council remains one of the fundamental challenges surrounding sanctions. Because sanctions regimes require agreement among the permanent members and depend upon continued Council cooperation, geopolitical disagreements can affect whether sanctions are adopted, renewed, modified, or monitored effectively. Recent developments have also demonstrated how disagreements can affect expert monitoring, while the Council's 2025 practice showed continued reliance on sanctions committees and monitoring mechanisms across numerous regimes. Consequently, delegates should approach sanctions not simply as economic punishment, but as a diplomatic instrument whose success depends on clear objectives, proportionality, humanitarian safeguards, reliable monitoring, due process, and genuine international cooperation.

# 9. CASE STUDIES

## United States of America

The United States generally views Security Council sanctions as an essential instrument for preventing threats to international peace and security without immediately resorting to military force. Washington D.C. has traditionally supported

strong sanctions concerning terrorism, nuclear proliferation, armed conflicts, and governments that violate international obligations, and it continues to favour targeted financial restrictions, travel bans, arms embargoes, and measures against individuals and entities. In 2026, the United States has been particularly active in advocating stronger UN sanctions concerning Sudan, proposing that the existing arms embargo covering Darfur be expanded to the entire country and explicitly include drones and related technologies. The American position therefore tends to favour stronger and more enforceable sanctions, while also supporting humanitarian safeguards such as the exemption established by Resolution 2664 (2022), which states that sanctions should not obstruct legitimate humanitarian assistance.

A key issue for delegates is that the United States also makes extensive use of unilateral sanctions outside the UNSC framework, which creates disagreement with Russia and China over the legitimacy and consequences of such measures. The American delegation is likely to argue that sanctions must be capable of producing genuine political pressure and should not be weakened to the point where they become symbolic. At the same time, Washington faces criticism that extensive sanctions can produce economic consequences beyond the intended targets, particularly when financial institutions become excessively cautious about transactions involving sanctioned states. For a UNSC delegate, the important question is therefore not whether the United States supports sanctions, but how far the Council should go in strengthening them while preserving humanitarian protections and international legitimacy.

## United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has historically been one of the strongest supporters of Security Council sanctions and played a particularly important role in the development of the UN sanctions system. A significant historical example is Southern Rhodesia, where the UK had responsibility as the colonial power while the Security Council progressively imposed sanctions against the illegal minority-government regime. Resolution 232 (1966) imposed sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, while Resolution 253 (1968) strengthened them into a comprehensive mandatory regime and established a committee to monitor implementation. This history is particularly relevant because it demonstrates that the United Kingdom has long regarded sanctions as a legitimate means of supporting international law,

political transition, and self-determination when diplomatic pressure alone is insufficient. Today, Britain continues to support sanctions as an important component of collective security, particularly concerning terrorism, proliferation, armed conflict, and violations of international law. The UK has also been closely involved with France and Germany in the Iran nuclear issue, including the 2025 decision to trigger the mechanism associated with the restoration of UN sanctions under Resolution 2231; this remains a major source of disagreement with Russia and China in 2026. Britain is therefore likely to advocate effective, targeted, evidence-based sanctions, while maintaining humanitarian exemptions and improving implementation rather than abandoning sanctions altogether. For delegates, the British position can be understood as an attempt to preserve the authority of the Security Council by ensuring that sanctions are sufficiently strong to influence state behaviour but sufficiently precise to avoid unnecessary harm to civilians.

## France

France generally supports Security Council sanctions when they are based on international law, have clearly defined objectives, and form part of a broader diplomatic strategy. Paris has consistently emphasised that sanctions should not become an end in themselves, but should contribute to conflict prevention, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and the restoration of international peace and security. France is currently playing a particularly important role in the Iran sanctions debate because it holds the Security Council presidency in September 2026, with the Iran nuclear question expected to be a major issue before the Council. France, together with the UK and Germany, supported the 2025 restoration of sanctions connected with Iran's nuclear obligations, making France one of the principal P5 advocates for maintaining pressure on Tehran.

France is also likely to support improvements that make sanctions more precise, transparent, and humanitarianly responsible. Resolution 2664 (2022) is particularly relevant to this approach because it established a humanitarian exception designed to prevent sanctions from obstructing legitimate humanitarian activities. At the same time, France faces the practical challenge of maintaining unity among the P5, particularly because Russia and China oppose the restoration and monitoring of certain Iran sanctions mechanisms. In committee, the French delegation would therefore likely favour a compromise in which sanctions remain strong but are

accompanied by clear humanitarian exemptions, monitoring mechanisms, review procedures, and diplomatic pathways for sanctioned states to regain compliance.

## Russian Federation

Russia takes a significantly more cautious approach to Security Council sanctions and frequently argues that sanctions should be used only when they are clearly justified under the UN Charter and should not become instruments of political pressure by individual states. Moscow strongly opposes unilateral sanctions that are not authorised by the Security Council, and it has repeatedly argued that such measures can damage international economic relations and undermine the authority of the UN system. Russia has also opposed the expansion or continuation of certain sanctions mechanisms when it considers that their political objectives have been exhausted or that they interfere with diplomatic settlement. A major recent example is Iran, where Russia and China have opposed the re-establishment of the sanctions committee's expert-monitoring mechanism, arguing that the Security Council no longer has the necessary mandate to continue that process.

Russia's position is therefore not simply that all UN sanctions should disappear; rather, Moscow tends to demand strict limits, clear legal justification, humanitarian safeguards, and defined political objectives. This position can also be seen in Russia's 2024 veto of the renewal of the expert panel monitoring sanctions against North Korea, demonstrating its willingness to block sanctions-related mechanisms when it believes they no longer serve an appropriate purpose. Russia is likely to resist proposals that it perceives as expanding sanctions regimes indefinitely or using sanctions as a substitute for diplomacy. For delegates, understanding Russia's position is essential because any proposal requiring P5 consensus must account for Moscow's ability to use its veto and its preference for negotiations, sovereignty, and limits on what it considers politically motivated sanctions.

## People's Republic of China

China generally supports sanctions when they are authorised by the Security Council, consistent with international law, proportionate, and designed to preserve international peace rather than punish populations. Beijing strongly opposes unilateral coercive measures that it considers to lack a basis in international law or Security Council authorisation, arguing that such measures can harm ordinary people and interfere with the economic sovereignty of states. China nevertheless

participates in UN sanctions regimes and has supported sanctions dealing with issues such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation when they have been adopted through the Security Council. Its current position is particularly important regarding Iran and North Korea, where China has increasingly challenged sanctions mechanisms that it believes have become ineffective or have moved beyond their original diplomatic purpose. In 2026, China is aligned with Russia in opposing the re-establishment of the Iran sanctions monitoring mechanism, while France, the UK, and the United States favour maintaining pressure concerning Iran's nuclear obligations. China is therefore likely to advocate a greater emphasis on dialogue, negotiated settlements, humanitarian exemptions, and periodic review of sanctions, rather than indefinite economic pressure. For delegates, China's position provides an important counterargument to sanctions-heavy approaches: the Council must consider whether sanctions are actually changing the behaviour of their target or merely deepening economic hardship and geopolitical division. A Chinese proposal would consequently be more likely to call for clear expiration or review mechanisms, humanitarian protections, and negotiations alongside sanctions rather than simply expanding restrictions.

# 10. POSITION PAPER AND RESEARCH GUIDE

## Position Paper

Position Paper (PP) is a document where you write about your country's stance in relation to the topic discussed by the committee. All of the delegates are required to write this paper prior to the conference, with the deadline set by the Chairboard, and usually announced on the Facebook groups. On average, a Position Paper is 600-800 words in length, but the word limit is not strict. It is recommended, though, that the Position Paper does not include everything you know about the topic. Do not in depth about your solutions, as it will be easier for other members of the committee to form counterarguments against you, and you will not have an element of surprise during committee sessions.

It is prohibited to use the first person singular “I” as you are not representing your view, but that of your country/NGO/company etc. Instead, you may use words such as “the delegate” if you have substantive voting ability, “the representative” if you

are an observer and do not have substantive voting ability, or simply “we”. If you use any reports, quotes, statistics, etc. you are supposed to include citations in the bibliography at the end.

**Elements to remember to have in your Position Paper**

1. Include an emphasis on the importance of the issue and the country's/organisation’s approach to the topic. You may want to use statistics, reports, etc. in this section. Use information that is only favourable for your country!!! If the stance of your actor is that the topic is not of high importance, you may state that. Then, you may proceed to your actor’s general approach to the topic.

2. Focus on past actions the country you are representing undertook to solve the issue at hand, either on a national or international level. These show how the actor has been handling the situation through exact case studies that your actor has partaken in. The past actions can become a helpful line of defence or offence for other delegates.

3. State current policies and international regulations, including policies of international organisations the country/organisation partakes in. In the case of representing an NGO, you may want to include policies relating to the topic or how they are handling the issue in the present time.

4. Finally, you propose possible solutions. This is probably the most important part of the Position Paper. That is because they not only appear in the Resolution, but also show which components of the topic you want to explore and collaborate on most. Here, you want to present any solutions to the issue that fulfil your actor’s needs. Those might be the ones you found during your research or the ones you thought of, but should be based on your research and the knowledge you obtained before the drafting of the Position Paper.

The position paper (PP) is of utmost importance, as during the committee work you are required to read out an opening statement that is based on your position paper. The time for the policy statement is 90 seconds, so you may want to either read a shortened version of your PP or create a new, persuasive speech.

**Exemplary Position Paper**

Outline of the problem
Arguments favoring your player
Attacking other players1
1 This is particularly important, since it heats up the debate, so when you are aware that a given player has a checkered past, do not be afraid to mention their hypocrisy in the position paper :)
Referencing statistics and concrete actions
Implying solutions and topics for committee sessions

**Position Paper**
**Country:** Central African Republic
**Committee:** Security Council
**Topic:** Discussing means to resolve the civil war in the Central African Republic.
On behalf of the only righteous government of the Central African Republic, led by H.E. Mr. Faustin-Archange Touadéra,

Throughout its post-colonial history, our beautiful and rich homeland has been suffering from exploitation, slavery and dictatorship. The ongoing civil war in our country shall be considered an apogee of European neocolonialism and their failure to fulfil the standards of their democratic values. Jean-Bédel Bokassa. André Kolingba. François Bozizé. What's common between these three names - all of them were the traitors of the Central African people, inglorious military dictators, who were put to rule the country by external powers and sold the freedom and natural resources of our country for incentives and personal benefit from the French. Manipulated like a marionette, they got their hands covered in the blood of Central Africans, whose only demand was to leave and develop in peace.

However, the main emphasis shall be put on the last aforementioned dictator - François Bozizé, whose actions in the current state are causing the prolongation of the civil war, putting more and more lives of our people at risk. When Bozizé seized (They may ask a Point of Information demanding a clarification to said statement, but fear not, that is when the fun begins, and when you can utilize your eristic ploys.) power during the popular insurrection of 15 March, the first thing he did was surround Bangui with Chadian troops, which remained the main military force in the country at the time and had been committing atrocious human rights violations

towards the civilians, including executions and looting every trapping of prosperity to transfer it to their homes to Chad. And when people started to show their protest - he asked Idriss Déby, the president of Chad back then, for more "help" to shut the demonstrations down, even creating a so-called Central Office for the Repression of Banditry, which violated the human rights of our citizens even more. Time went by, comprised of events that had a significant impact on CAR's history, such as the Central African Republic Bush War, the start of ongoing civil war, government takeover by rebels as well as its regaining by governmental structures and the transitional government with democratic elections after it, where Faustin-Archange Touadéra became a president.

Yet still, in the next elections, after the candidature of François Bozizé was rejected by the CAR top court, following the UN sanctions against him, and decided to turn to rebels, which at the time formed a joint coalition named "Coalition of Patriots for Change" (CPC) and ask for help in an attempted coup. Despite the arisen security issues, the G5 and the government in Bangui pursued a strategy of "elections at all costs." As a result, the December 2020 vote was on schedule, but it was not safe. Electoral convoys were attacked by the CPC - in some towns, armed groups destroyed ballot boxes. Still, in many areas, Central Africans turned out in surprisingly high numbers to voice their exasperation with armed groups and Bozizé's attempted coup. The fact that François Bozizé turned to armed groups to undermine the elections suggests that he doesn't have sufficient support among civilians to mobilize popular uprisings. Therefore, François Bozizé does not possess a single right to be a leader of the Central African Republic and tackle its internal and external affairs, and we firmly believe that this individual shall be brought to the International Criminal Court for his crimes against humanity.

Moving on to the CPC and setting a strong position regarding rebels - the government of Faustin-Archange Touadéra is not open to a negotiation process, considering the fragility of this coalition of terrorist groups as a whole - it is separated inside due to multiple armed groups being a part of it. CPC suffers from internal conflicts itself, and recalling the previous Anti-balaka and ex-Séléka cleanings on a religious basis - how can we negotiate with this group, if it does not even possess structured demands and just spreads terror among the country, destabilising the whole system and whose leader is currently under the UN sanctions? This question shall be left as a rhetorical one.

Back in 2017, when the country was still suffering from numerous attacks and was nearly taken over by rebels, our government had been respectfully asking for support, mainly military, from its partners. No country responded besides the Russian Federation and Rwanda, and we express our strong gratitude. Moreover, the CAR was left by France, which withdrew its forces in 2021, nevertheless keeping our economy under their influence. With the military support of the Russian Federation, Rwanda and the UN MINUSCA peacekeeping mission, currently, the governmental forces control the majority of the Central African Republic. We aim to continue the military cooperation with the aforementioned countries and seek cooperation with whomever interested in it, to finally free our homeland and set a lasting peace in the region.

After restoring peace in the Central African Republic, we are determined to improve its economic and geopolitical state. A few of the many actions that the Faustin-Archange Touadéra's government is currently working on and that are to be taken to restore the economy concern i.a trade diversification and cooperation - opening Africa for a wider market under the Economic Community of Central African States and African Continental Free Trade Area and participating in the People's Republic of China's Belt and Road initiative, as well as support for local entrepreneurs and education settings to boost the economy, yet more means that could potentially benefit the CAR's economy we wish to discuss during the committee session. With the financial help of intergovernmental organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations, we also aim to receive support with the decolonisation, fiscal and security sector reforms, to finally make the Central African Republic and the whole continent a prosperous and stable land.
Unité, Dignité, Travail.

As has been mentioned before, the Study Guide is not a PhD on the topic and should serve solely as a basis for further research. Delegates should possess knowledge personalised to the policy of their country, and the Study Guide outlines only general information. We, the chairboard, have prepared a Further Reading section to help you with that. Furthermore, below you will find guidance for conducting research useful for any Model United Nations conference.

First and foremost, it is crucial to have elementary knowledge about the country a delegate is representing.

- What is the political system and governing body of my country?
- What is the classification of the economy (HIC, MIC, LIC, etc.) of my country?
- What is the geographical location of my country?
- What is my country's foreign policy?

If you are an Observer, not all questions may apply. In the case of NGOs we recommend focusing on the aims and reason for its establishment, what strategies they undertake to solve problems, its funding, and areas of action. If you are representing a company, consider its primary interest when it comes to the topic.

In order to thrive during committee sessions, you need to understand the topic itself on a profound level. It is recommended to incorporate in your arguments statistics and be mindful of their source, but also causes and effects of a particular issue.

After that, you have two components (knowledge about the country & understanding of the topic) that just need to be connected. All you have to do to accomplish that is research how your actor adheres to what is going to be discussed in the committee.

This includes:

- Past actions;
- Existing policies;
- Future plans;
- International regulations;
- Policies applicable to the actor;
- International actions the actor took part in.

You have to have an idea of the policies and actions of other actors present in the committee. This is very important as it comes in handy during the General Speaker's List (GSL) (especially during Points of Information (PoI's)!), and during moderated caucuses. You want to research every wrongdoing they committed in the past, holes in their logic, their strange policies and actions – this will help you manipulate the rest of the committee to perceive their arguments as, essentially, nothing but a deflection, and for your ideas to be favoured. Take into account that this information should be credible, as any delegate is permitted to ask for the source of that information through raising a Motion to Cite the Source.

## Exemplary Policy statement:

Obligatory to state
Explaining the player's stance with regards to the topic
Attacking other players GET 'EM TIGER
Convincing other players to abide by the policy of your player
Honourable Chairs, Fellow Delegates,

On behalf of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, we express our intense gratitude and appreciation for your eagerness to act and discuss today's highly imperative topic, which is China's Belt and Road initiative.

Pakistan undoubtedly remains a strategically vital country within the BRI, with its joint cooperative with China named the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor", which, throughout the years of its development, has proved to be extremely efficient for our economy and continues fostering the standards of living of our beloved citizens.

Nevertheless, although our economic ties with China are and will remain close, one must acknowledge, that the glorious state of Pakistan is independent and sovereign, thus, safeguarding our interests will always be our main priority. We believe that the negotiations upon the completion of the CPEC are not full and the provisions of the agreement can be changed in a way for them to be more advantageous to Pakistan and China respectively.

Pakistan opposes every form of neocolonialism and considers the policies of France, Germany and the US highly hypocritical, as the Chinese way of fostering world trade, which aforementioned countries dare to call "neocolonialism" cannot be compared to the atrocities conducted by French in Central Africa for the whole 60 years, as well as economic isolation and exploitation of South American states by the US.

Moreover, seeing their disadvantage in Southern Asia, these countries dare to further develop their trade relations with the terrorist state of India as a counterweight. And the fellow delegates are willing to stand by these ideas?

We strongly encourage the world community to pick the right side.

Let the Alla-ah guide us through our deliberations and ensure, that the agreement will be reached. Glory to Pakistan. The delegate is open to any and all points of information and yields the floor.

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